INTRODUCTION

1. In November 1998 the Paymaster General and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Cabinet Office invited me to review civil procurement in Central Government in the light of the Government's objectives on efficiency, modernisation and competitiveness in the short and medium term and to report as soon as possible.

Following Ministerial changes that took place in December 1998, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury became responsible for procurement matters.

2. This Review was initiated following the Prime Minister's interest in the report that the Ministerial Cabinet Committee on Public Expenditure (PX) had commissioned in January 1998 and which was published in July 1998.

3. The term 'procurement' has many different interpretations. Throughout this Review 'procurement' means the whole process of acquisition from third parties (including the logistical aspects) and covers goods, services and construction projects. This process spans the whole life cycle from initial concept and definition of business needs through to the end of the useful life of an asset or end of a services contract. Both conventionally funded and more innovative types (e.g. PFI/PPP) of funded projects are included. This definition is consistent with modern supply chain management practices and that used in the 1995 White Paper (CM 2840) Setting New Standards.

The process is not limited to the purchasing function in departments and is inherently multi-functional especially in large, complex and / or novel procurements.

4. Total annual procurement spend in the civil Departments, their Agencies and NDPBs is estimated to be in excess of £12.9 billion at current prices. The scale and breadth of this level of expenditure demands the highest levels of efficiency to achieve the best possible value for money. In addition the composition of this expenditure has been changing and will continue to change significantly through:

   a) the Prime Minister's modernisation agenda including the focus on outcomes and joined-up Government initiatives

   b) the need to achieve value for money savings through better procurement in order to release resources to support the key policy objectives of the Government

   c) the increasing use by Government of purchased services, e.g. outsourced facilities management, provision of turn-key systems and the use of third parties to deliver public services
5. My thanks are especially due to Martin Darcy from HM Treasury and Janet Beach from the Court Service who gave me valuable assistance throughout the Review and Carolyn Knight from HM Treasury for her excellent administrative support. I am also grateful to all the organisations and individuals who met with me or produced written submissions.

II. STRUCTURE & CONDUCT OF THE REVIEW

1. In order to address the very broad remit of this Review, I sought inputs from a number of Government Departments, HM Treasury, the Cabinet Office, the NAO, and a cross-section of suppliers to Government through a combination of meetings and written submissions.

2. These inputs were structured around invited responses to 6 questions:
   a) How important is procurement as an activity in civil government?
   b) Is the structure and organisation of civil procurement activities (e.g. Departmental, Treasury Procurement Group, CCTA, The Buying Agency) efficient and effective?
   c) Does the procurement function have the right level of skills and capability to help achieve the Government’s objectives on efficiency, modernisation and competitiveness?
   d) Can the Government make better use of its purchasing power and collective expertise with suppliers e.g. through appropriate aggregation of departmental requirements, to secure procurement savings?
   e) Are departments making full use of the flexibility, announced in the Comprehensive Spending Review, to reinvest savings arising from improving the efficiency of procurement?
   f) What levels of savings are achievable through more efficient and effective civil procurement?

3. Twenty meetings were held with Government officials, (including nine involving Permanent Secretaries), nine meetings with senior executives of suppliers to Government and one meeting with the CBI Industrial Policy Group. Forty written submissions were received from various Government Departments, Agencies and NDPBs. Twenty written submissions came from industry.

4. In addition, a survey questionnaire was sent to 100 other suppliers to Government and 28 replies were received.
5. The Review also took account of the three previous studies of Government procurement that have been undertaken in this decade, namely:

- Efficiency in Civil Government Procurement (the PX Report) - July 1998
- Organisation of Procurement in Government Departments and their Agencies March 1993

6. In order to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the current procurement arrangements, I considered the following seven aspects:

- Policy
- Organisation and Structure
- Process
- Measurement
- People
- Supply Base
- Implementation

to provide a comprehensive structure within which to analyse the above inputs, identify the key findings and propose my recommendations.

### III. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### A. POLICY

**Findings**

1. Decisions by previous Governments to decentralise and delegate authority for procurement to Departments have been implemented without establishing a common framework within which Departments must operate to ensure coherence in how public money is spent.

2. Inputs from the supply base highlighted a lack of consistency and common process, as well as a very wide spectrum between best and worst practice in Government procurement. Two interviews with industry illustrated that this spectrum exists even within the same Agency of a Government Department.
3. The Review undertook a study of the electricity and gas prices paid by Departments and benchmarked these against those paid by a number of large private sector companies. This showed that the lowest prices obtained by Departments were comparable to those secured by best in class private sector organisations, but the highest prices exceeded the lowest prices by 66% in the case of electricity and 140% in the case of gas.

This results from insufficient aggregation of requirements and the consequent limitations on being able to take full advantage of a competitive energy supply market.

4. 62% of the survey responses confirmed that different Departments were applying different rules, policies and practices to the procurement of essentially similar requirements.

5. Delegation to the maximum extent possible of what is bought, is a management principle that brings great benefits. It is also the case that organisations with best in class procurement performance have recognised the need to mandate some level of commonality of approach to procurement (not centralisation) in order to secure such benefits as leverage with key suppliers, maximum value for money from the aggregation of appropriate requirements and facilitating the widespread use of best practice.

Recommendations

6. A common strategic framework should be established within which all Departments will conduct their procurement activities in future. This framework will include:

- a standard procurement process (see C below)
- common performance measures
- key standards (e.g. for e-commerce)
- common systems (e.g. for information about suppliers)
- key values (e.g. a code of good customer practice, working together across Departmental boundaries)

7. If a Department considers any part of this framework to be inappropriate to its needs, then in order to act outside of the framework, up-front agreement must be obtained from the proposed new central organisation (see B below)

8. I recommend that this framework be approved by Cabinet or the Public Services Expenditure Committee (PSX) so that it is seen to have the necessary top level cross Departmental support.
B. ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURE

Findings

1. The issue of organisation and structure of the various activities in the Cabinet Office and Treasury (‘the Centre’) was the one raised most frequently in the submissions the Review received.

2. Central activities involved wholly, or having a significant involvement, with procurement include:
   - The Buying Agency (TBA) - Cabinet Office Executive Agency
   - CCTA - Cabinet Office Executive Agency
   - PACE - Cabinet Office Executive Agency
   - COI - Cabinet Office Executive Agency
   - PFI Taskforce - HM Treasury
   - Procurement Group - HM Treasury
   - Wider Markets Team - HM Treasury

3. The fragmentation and lack of co-ordination of these activities results in the Centre lacking the 'clout' necessary to lead Government procurement into the 21st Century.

4. It was clear from many submissions that there is a widespread recognition of the need for, and benefit of, a central body which ensures consistency of policy, avoids re-invention of wheels, catalyses appropriate aggregation and promotes best practice.

5. In general the input regarding these central activities, when considered on an individual basis, ranged from neutral to positive, with the concern being focussed on the overall lack of integration and co-ordination.

6. However, TBA attracted a much broader spread of comments ranging from strongly negative to very complimentary, and a number of inputs queried the clarity and relevance of the role and mission of this Agency.

7. There is no single person or body accountable for the deployment of resources involved in central procurement activities and I consider that these resources are being utilised in a sub-optimal manner in terms of ensuring the best overall procurement performance by Government.
8. This fragmentation and lack of co-ordination results in the Centre having an unnecessarily limited 'value add' and not being able to act as a strong catalyst in improving overall Government procurement.

Recommendations

9. A single 'one-stop shop' procurement central organisation should be created by combining as many of the resources of the above central activities as is possible. As a minimum I recommend the activities of:

- Procurement Group
- PFI Task force
- TBA
- PACE
- CCTA

are included in this new central organisation, which I have called Office of Government Commerce (OGC) throughout the remainder of this report.

The key role and responsibilities of this new organisation are set out in Annex 1.

10. Although the OGC will begin its life with a set of inherited resources and activities, its role is not to maintain the status quo. As the new organisation begins to focus on the real high value added activities, I envisage that its inherited profile of activities will change rapidly and this will require both the re-allocation of existing resources and re-profiling of the OGC's skill base. An initial injection of a small number of high calibre staff in order to kick start the organisation will also be required.

11. At the same time as strengthening the effectiveness of the Centre, I recommend an OGC Supervisory Board is established to help ensure a coherent cross Departmental approach to procurement, and to provide on-going top-level support and strategic direction to the OGC.

The Supervisory Board would be chaired by the Chief Secretary to the Treasury (who would then be responsible for reporting to the Cabinet and the Public Services Expenditure Committee on overall civil Government procurement policy and performance).

I suggest membership of this Board includes:

- a senior Cabinet Office representative (recognising this department's continuing strategic interest in procurement)
• senior level official representation from the Treasury Public Services Directorate
• senior level official representation from a cross-section of large and small departments
• the Heads of Procurement from N. Ireland, Scotland and Wales (to ensure that the benefits of a more coherent approach to procurement are not lost as devolution occurs)
• one or two senior representatives from the private sector
• an observer from the National Audit Office
• the Chief Executive of the OGC

The proposed terms of reference of the Board are to:

• approve and monitor the business plan of the OGC
• direct matters of public procurement policy and strategy, and where appropriate, make recommendations to the Cabinet (or the Public Services Expenditure Committee) in order to achieve consistent cross Government procurement performance at best in class levels
• take responsibility for approving targets and monitoring the performance against these targets arising from improved procurement across Government
• act as a 'check and balance' between the OGC and individual Departments

C. PROCESS

Findings

1. There is no well defined, common 'cradle to grave' process for managing procurements which are large, complex, novel, or some combination of these criteria. This puts important acquisitions of goods, services, or construction projects - funded either conventionally or by other means such as PFI - within, or across, Departments at unnecessary risk as there is no common mechanism for strategically controlling such procurements throughout their life cycle.
2. No common cross Departmental process exists for the management of the supplier base.

3. Departments and some of the central functions are concerned that some suppliers are currently enjoying differential pricing because of the failure to co-ordinate the management of these suppliers.

4. A number of Government submissions recognised the advantages to be gained from a common database of information about suppliers, better understanding of the supply base's cost drivers and genuine partnership relationships with industry.

5. Many industry submissions identified the benefits Government would obtain from adopting a more 'private sector' approach to procurement (allowing for the need to comply with European Community procurement regime) especially in the area of customer-supplier relationships based on a partnership approach.

6. A significant number of senior level Government inputs identified concern about the potential level of dependence on a small number of key suppliers in areas of strategic importance and the inability to collectively identify this level of dependence without asking the suppliers for the data.

Recommendations

7. A well defined, common process for the strategic management of large, complex or novel (or some combination of these criteria) procurements should be implemented based on the following principles:

- projects have distinct phases in their life-cycle
- the 'gates' between these phases can be characterised by sets of deliverables (e.g. requirements specification, procurement plan, project management plan, risk management plan)
- deliverables should be assessed by people with relevant expertise who are independent of the project
- important 'gates' (typically 3 in the life cycle) can only be passed as a result of successful reviews chaired by senior people who have no vested interest in the outcome of the review.

An example of the main elements of a generic procurement process is illustrated in Annex 2.
When a review is not successful the review chairman should bring the matter to the attention of the relevant Departmental Permanent Secretary and the Chief Executive of the OGC who will need to agree the action to be taken.

8. The detailed definition of this process, including the required deliverables at each gate, should be led by the OGC who will take into account external best practice and the experience gained from both recent successes and failures in Government procurement of large, complex, or novel projects.

9. Such a process will:
   - help to ensure a more consistent and enhanced level of performance on project orientated procurements, thereby saving money and boosting efficiency
   - catalyse widespread use of best practice, as this will increasingly be documented in the definition of the deliverables
   - provide a foundation for procurements which support joined-up Government initiatives

10. The OGC should develop a common process for the management of the supplier base, with top priority being given to those suppliers who are involved in the provision of goods and services which are critical to the successful operation of Government. Such a process must be firmly based on measurable data. It should also define the role of the OGC in the management of the overall relationship with suppliers and the role of Departments in managing individual project based relationships with suppliers.

D. MEASUREMENT

Findings

1. There are no common systems across Government for:
   - recording what is purchased, the associated prices and sources of supply
   - analysing the true costs of procurement transactions
• rating the capability and performance of suppliers
• targeting and measuring year on year value for money improvements from the procurement function

2. Good common measurement systems are an essential component of any procurement system which aspires to be best in class. The complete absence of any such systems is the finding that gave me the greatest concern during the course of this Review.

3. One Department told me that the level of savings from improved procurement is difficult to gauge and admitted that there was only a hazy idea on how much was spent and no clear data on what was bought. Another Departmental input indicated that there was a general understanding of how much had been spent, but the IT systems and purchasing classifications were not sufficiently strong to identify what had been bought.

4. The only area where the Review obtained comparable data on a like for like basis was in the area of electricity and gas supply. Reference has already been made in III A.3 to the results of the analysis. If the Department that paid the highest rate for electricity had the benefit of the lowest rate in Government the saving would amount to almost £2.5m per annum.

5. Without visibility of the true costs of procurement transactions the management appetite for e-commerce is substantially diminished; the speed of take-up of the Government Procurement Card is symptomatic of this. It is a cause for concern that those aspects of the Prime Minister's modernisation agenda, dependent on the widespread adoption of e-commerce in Government procurement, are at risk.

6. During discussions with Departments it became clear that in some instances comparisons of prices obtained by CCTA and TBA under framework agreements are not being undertaken on a like for like basis. Some Departments appear to regard the overhead costs incurred in undertaking their own procurements as sunk costs while the prices offered to them by these Agencies include the associated transaction costs.

7. The absence of a common system for rating the capability and performance of suppliers results both in unnecessary duplication of effort in Government and the supply base, and contributes to the overall sub-optimal management of suppliers.

8. The absence of a common system for targeting and measuring value for money improvements from procurement (both cost
reduction and cost avoidance) means that senior management lacks an essential best in class tool for the strategic management of procurement activities.

9. Overall the weakness in the measurement area disadvantages Government because there is a lack of data; this inhibits informed decision making on many procurement matters. Objective inter-Departmental and external price-tracking are not currently an integral part of procurement management.

Recommendations

10. The OGC should define, in conjunction with Departments, common ways of recording what is bought, the associated prices and sources of supply. Departments will then need to modify or upgrade their purchasing systems accordingly. Such actions will include the consistent implementation across Departments of a common coding system. Examples include the National Supplier Vocabulary that was referred to in the 1998 PX Report, or the Common Procurement Vocabulary currently being recommended by the European Commission.

11. Departments must implement systems to ensure that the true costs of procurement transactions can be measured. The adoption of Resource Accounting should assist in this area.

12. The OGC should identify certain common types of transaction which have a high cost to Government either as a result of the volume or complexity of such transactions, and work with Departments to help reduce these costs through techniques such as e-commerce and procurement cards.

13. The OGC should work with Departments to produce a common system for rating the capability and performance of suppliers. Wherever possible capability measurement should be based on recognised external benchmarks (e.g the Business Excellence Model). Performance ratings should be based on objective measurement of recent track record on Government contracts where these exist.

14. A common system for measuring value for money improvements (i.e. both cost reduction and cost avoidance) must be developed by the OGC. The General Guidance on Targets and Savings issued in May 1994 may provide a useful starting point.

The system must not impose a heavy data collection burden on Departments.
E. PEOPLE

Findings

1. Although there are some very talented and capable people within the Government Procurement Service that is now being established, I concluded that the overall levels of skill, capability and seniority need to be raised significantly.

2. With some notable exceptions the function lacks the necessary 'clout' and influence to fully meet both the current and future challenges of Government procurement.

3. The mechanisms for planning the new procurement skills required to support new policies and initiatives such as joined-up Government are too weak, resulting in ad-hoc approaches to new challenges and excessive dependency on expensive external consultants.

4. During a number of meetings with Departmental Heads of Procurement it became clear that there is too much focus by procurement staff on low value commodity items and insufficient involvement in business critical procurements e.g. outsourcing and PFI contracts, where qualified personnel could add the greatest value.

5. The most recent survey of procurement staff showed that in 1997, the procurement function in government lost 17% of its staff - almost all of these were qualified. Since 71% of these left within 12 months of qualifying, there is evidence to suggest that the better staff use their qualifications in order to find more attractive jobs in the private sector. There is little to suggest that this very serious situation has improved.

6. Another Department's input identified that having the right skills was necessary but not sufficient; ensuring those with the skills are in a position to exercise influence is also key. This is a function of the seniority and leadership skills of Departmental Heads of Procurement who in general do not report directly to their Permanent Secretaries.

7. Industry also expressed a concern that in some Departments too many matters related to high value procurements were delegated by senior officials to junior staff.

Recommendations
8. The proposed OGC should be run by a Chief Executive at Permanent Secretary or equivalent level.

9. In Departments with large procurement expenditures the Head of Procurement should be a Grade 3 or equivalent level appointment, reporting wherever possible direct to the Departmental Permanent Secretary. Such appointments will require the approval of both the Departmental Permanent Secretary and the OGC Chief Executive in addition to any other approvals that may be required. Equivalent arrangements should be implemented in Agencies and NDPBs with large procurement expenditures.

10. A strong planning function needs to be implemented within the OGC so that procurement skills required to support new Government policies and initiatives can be developed in good time.

11. The actions related to staff development in the 1998 PX Report need to be updated in the light of progress to date and vigorously reinforced by the OGC. In particular the actions related to the % of the Government Procurement Service in designated posts having a graduate level procurement qualification require urgent attention. As a matter of high priority, the OGC should identify causes for the current difficulties in the recruitment, motivation and retention of professionally qualified procurement staff and should put in place an action plan to reverse the situation.

12. Departmental procurement skills and capabilities will be an important feature of the proposed periodic reviews between OGC and Departments. I would expect these to sustain pressure on continuing to raise the level of professional knowledge, skills and seniority of procurement staff. Over time the implementation of this and other recommendations (e.g. the creation of a favourable environment for the widespread adoption of e-commerce) will lead to a smaller, more skilled, better paid and motivated procurement function across Government.

13. Where a Department (or Agency or NDPB) is unable to justify an appropriately skilled and managed procurement function, an action plan must be agreed with the OGC on how procurement matters will be managed.

F. SUPPLY BASE

Findings
1. There was widespread agreement that UK Government procurement is fair and open, and compares well with other countries.

2. Tendering to Government is burdensome and costly to suppliers. Inputs from industry indicated that bidding for Government contracts is typically 10 - 50% more costly than bidding for comparable projects in the private sector with the key drivers of these cost burdens being the greater level of detail required and more extended time scales.

3. A number of industry inputs highlighted that the magnitude of these costs is deterring potential bidders from competing. Some bidders try to recover the cost of lost tenders in new bids for Government contracts.

4. Industry submissions also referred to the scope of innovative proposals being limited when Departmental requirements were prescriptive in how they were to be met, rather than describing the required output and performance levels to be achieved.

5. Despite declared Government procurement policy being based on value for money rather than lowest initial cost, many inputs from industry highlighted a perception that the culture of the Civil Service is risk averse and the 'safe' option is justifying the lowest up front cost. While Invitations to Tender do usually specify the value for money criteria, it does not appear to be standard practice even to specify the relative priority and weightings of the different criteria.

6. Communication between the Centre and Departments was perceived to be weak, leading to key policies such as value for money being interpreted in different ways.

7. Many industry inputs identified that Government's behaviour as a customer is not consistently seen as best in class and that the gap between the best and worst procurement behaviour across, and sometimes within, Departments is very wide.

**Recommendations**

8. Within the bounds permitted by European Community procurement regime, Departments need to be more sensitive to the burdens which their procurement procedures place on suppliers. The OGC should consult with industry to identify common causes of these burdens and take appropriate action with Departments.
9. In some sectors of supply the OGC needs to determine whether the base of suppliers is broad enough to maintain competition and innovation and take appropriate action through Government and Departmental initiatives to stimulate the interest of potential suppliers.

10. The above two recommendations may also provide a useful opportunity for a renewed impetus to attract more SMEs to bid for Government contracts.

11. In major purchases covered by the proposed common procurement process, I recommend that the procurement strategy takes into account the estimated total costs that will be borne by industry in bidding for the contract as well as the total costs to be borne by the Department.

12. Invitations to tender should provide a prioritised list together with an indication of the relative weightings of the value for money criteria that will be used in the evaluation process.

G. IMPLEMENTATION

Findings

1. Many of the findings of this Review have been identified in at least one of the three previous studies on procurement published since 1993. Despite these studies identifying many sensible recommendations and policies, I concluded that both properly resourced implementation plans and the necessary top level commitment have been lacking.

2. Fundamental reform of procurement systems in any large organisation requires a well resourced approach which is coherent and sustained over a number of years and which is visibly and consistently supported by top management.

3. I could find no evidence that such an approach had been put in place following earlier studies and it is therefore not particularly surprising that there is a very broad spectrum of procurement performance across Government and many earlier sensible recommendations have failed to realise their full potential.

Recommendations

4. It is essential that dedicated resources are allocated in the OGC to ensure that there is the sustained impetus to secure the necessary step change in procurement performance. This change is both achievable and essential to help meet the Government's objectives in competitiveness, efficiency and modernisation.
5. In the first year of operation of the OGC, I estimate that a small number of additional high calibre people will need to be added to the cost base. As the OGC integrates its inherited activities and focuses on the high value-added opportunities, I believe these additional people can be funded from within the inherited cost base after the first year of operation.

IV. FINANCIAL BENEFITS

1. As stated earlier, it has proved very difficult to obtain accurate information about the detailed nature of the annual procurement spend in the Departments covered by this Review due to the absence of essential common measurement systems. In addition, there are significant internal and external (e.g. consultants) costs borne by Government in the management and implementation of its procurements.

2. However it is clear, both from Government and Industry inputs, that the current position is far from optimal and there is substantial scope to achieve significant value for money improvements, comprising both cost reductions and cost avoidance, through reforms of the current procurement arrangements.

3. I therefore recommend that an overall value for money improvement target of £1 billion is set for achievement by the end 2001/2 Fiscal Year. While this is aspirational, I believe it contains a sensible degree of challenge which can be achieved through focussed and determined effort supported by the right leadership.

V. PROPOSED TIME SCALES

1. APRIL - OCTOBER 1999

Ministerial approval of this review

Initial communications campaign - Press Conference

- Supplier Conference
- Departmental 'Roadshow'

Consultation - Officials

- Industry
- Other stakeholders
Recruitment process for OGC Chief Executive

Identify the causes of the high attrition rate for procurement staff and develop an action plan.

Preparation of initial OGC business plan and 2000/01 budget

2. 1st OCTOBER 1999

Establish OGC and its Supervisory Board

3. OCTOBER 1999 - APRIL 2000

Develop the standard procurement process

Define common performance measures and interim arrangements for obtaining the relevant data.

Set the initial key standards

Establish the key values of Government procurement (e.g. code of good customer practice)

Develop model for measuring value for money improvements from improved procurement performances

Identify and set value for money improvements, by type of supply and Department, in order to achieve the £1billion target

Identify the areas where the OGC should undertake aggregated procurement

Develop process for management of the supplier base and common system for rating suppliers

Re-profiling of the senior procurement post to Grade 3 or equivalent level in appropriate Departments, Agencies and NDPBs

Development of generic transaction cost models

4. APRIL 2000

OGC fully operational and effective

Ministerial approval of the common strategic framework

75% of members of the Government Procurement Service to be professionally qualified
At least 3 new agreements negotiated for aggregated requirements which give substantial (10%+) savings over current arrangements

5. OCTOBER 2000

Report to PSX Committee to detail progress to date and update on action in hand in order to achieve value for money improvements of £1billion by 2002.

6. OCTOBER 2001

Ministerial approval of OGC proposals for value for money improvements in the period April 2002 to March 2005.

7. APRIL 2002

OGC able to demonstrate to Ministers that the £1billion target has been achieved.

PETER GERSHON
21 APRIL 1999
ANNEX 1

ROLE & RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PROPOSED OFFICE OF
GOVERNMENT COMMERCE

- Formulation of integrated procurement policy and strategy
- Represent UK on procurement matters in EU, WTO and other relevant international bodies
- Ownership of the generic procurement process
- Development of a common process for management of the supplier base
- Strategic management of key suppliers, especially those involved in providing goods and services which are critical to the successful operation of Government
- Measurement and benchmarking of procurement performance across Government
- Specifying e-commerce standards and sponsoring the development of products which facilitate their implementation across Government
- Undertaking procurement on behalf of Government where aggregation of requirements enables significant value for money improvements to be obtained
- Provision of a centre of excellence for strategic procurement skills e.g. PFI, outsourcing and the management of very large complex projects in areas such as IT and construction
- Planning for, and development of, new procurement skills
- Undertaking periodic procurement reviews of procurement performance, skills and capabilities with Departments
- Catalysing the spread of best in class procurement practice
- Functional leadership of the Government Procurement Service
- Working pro-actively with Departments to implement the recommendations of this Review